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Abstract: Conclusions of theoretical reasoning are assertions—or at least 
speech acts belonging to the class of assertives, such as hypotheses, pre-
dictions or estimates. What, however, are the conclusions of practical 
reasoning? Employing the concepts of speech act theory, in this paper I 
investigate which speech acts we perform when we’re done with an in-
stance of a practical argument and present its result in a linguistic form. 
To this end, I first offer a detailed scheme of practical argument suitable 
for an external pragmatic account (rather than an internal cognitive ac-
count). Resorting to actual examples, I then identify a class of action-
inducing speech acts as characteristic conclusions of practical argument. 
I argue that these speech acts—promises, orders, pieces of advice, pro-
posals, and others—differ chiefly depending on the agent of the action 
induced (me, us, you, them) and their illocutionary strength. 
Keywords: Illocution; practical argument; practical reasoning; speech 
acts. 
1. Introduction 
 Practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning are typically defined as, 
respectively, reasoning about what to do and about what to believe. Yet, 
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the seemingly innocent “about” might be quite misleading here, and in a 
dual sense. The distinction does not in fact pertain to 1) the content of 2) 
the premises which we are reasoning “about,” such as when we reason 
(whether practically or theoretically) “about” Brexit or Donald Trump. Ra-
ther, it refers to 1) the function of 2) the conclusion of reasoning. We thus 
reason “about” what we conclude we can do about Brexit or “about” what 
we conclude we should believe about Trump. Given this, the analysis of the 
function of the conclusion of reasoning is, by definition, crucial. This is my 
task for this paper.  
 In this task, I will avail myself of the basic idea of speech act theory, 
namely, that various functions of our language use can be comprehensively 
elucidated via the concept of speech acts.1 This requires attention to the 
conclusions of our reasoning as linguistically constituted via practical argu-
mentation—or at least linguistically represented; I give attention to this 
issue directly below, in Sections 2 and 3. Looking from the perspective of 
practical argumentation, and not just reasoning, the basic problem of this 
investigation can be represented as follows: 
 Conclusions of theoretical reasoning are assertions—or at least speech 
acts belonging to the class of assertives, such as hypotheses, predictions or 
estimates. This follows directly from standard definitions of assertives and 
of theoretical reasoning: both are about how things are and, as such, can be 
true or false. On a standard view (but see Section 2.4 for a challenge), 
theoretical reasoning is thus assertoric through and through: we insert var-
ious types of assertives as premises and conclude with another assertive. 
What, however, are the conclusions of practical reasoning? What do we do 
with words when we arrive at a conclusion of a practical argument? Which 
speech acts do we perform when we’re done with an instance of a practical 
argument? (Other than: “I’m done!”)  
 To answer these questions, in Section 3 I will offer a detailed scheme of 
practical argument suitable for an external pragmatic account (rather than 
an internal cognitive account). Resorting to actual examples (Section 4), I 
then identify a class of action-inducing speech acts as characteristic conclu-
sions of practical argument (Section 5). I argue that these speech acts—
                                                 
1  For recent accounts see (Green 2020) and (Fogal, et. al eds. 2018); for classic 
works see, of course, (Austin 1975) and (Searle 1969). 
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promises, orders, pieces of advice, proposals, and others—differ chiefly de-
pending on the agent of the action induced (me, us, you, them) and their 
illocutionary strength. 
2. What concludes practical reason? 
2.1. Attitudes or acts of a reasoning agent 
 Philosophical accounts of practical reasoning (henceforth: PR) are still 
dominated by the first-person perspective of a single reasoning agent (Audi 
2006; Broome 2013; Davidson 1963; Gauthier 1963; Pollock 1995; Searle 
2001)—even if work on collective intentions and actions is ever-more prom-
inent (Bratman 2014; Gilbert 1990; Searle 2010; Tuomela 2013). Accord-
ingly, the mainstream philosophical discussion over how to conclude PR 
revolves around the issue of the nature of the propositional attitude, or 
intentional state, which properly concludes PR. The conclusion is a result 
of reasoning from other states (premises) such as desires/intentions and 












Figure 1: The basic scheme of practical reasoning 
 
According to Searle, there is “a bewildering variety” of accounts of the 
elements of PR: they can be “desires, intentions, fiats, imperatives, norms, 
noemata, actions” (Searle 2001, 242)—and many of these can feature as 
CONCLUSION: 
Intention to take means m. 
I should do m.
PREMISE 1: 
Desire/Intention 
to achieve goal G. 




Means m gets me to G. 
I believe m leads to G. 
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PR’s conclusions.2 From the weakest to the strongest conclusion, one can 
recognise the following continuum:   
disposition to act (pro-attitude, secondary desire, practical judgment) 
decision to act (prior intention) 
intention to act (intention-in-action) 
action itself  
The crucial difference of opinion exists between those who think action itself 
is the proper conclusion of PR (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics; Searle 2001, 
136) and those who think this is plain wrong, for reasoning is limited to 
propositional entities and cannot extend beyond them—therefore an inten-
tion to act is as far as we can get (Gauthier 1963; Broome 2013). 
 Clearly, we are dealing here with a single reasoning agent pondering 
over the right course of action for her to take. This would be perfectly fine 
if the extrapolation from the simplest unit of individual reasoning to various 
forms of collective reasoning was warranted. But it seems it is not. Accord-
ing to Hitchcock (2002), an individualistic approach is at risk of producing 
a “solipsistic, egoistic and unsocial” understanding of PR. Referring to Pol-
lock’s (1995) account of PR where the basic scheme of Beliefs, Desires and 
Intentions is supplemented by a reasoning agent’s Likings, Hitchcock de-
scribes it as solipsistic, since “there is no provision for verbal input from, or 
verbal output to, other autonomous rational agents, still less for back-and-
forth discussion, whether argumentative or non-argumentative” (Hitchcock 
2002, 254). Further, “it is egoistic, in that the function of the entire system 
is to make the world more to the liking of that system itself” (2002, 254). 
As a result, “nothing […] permits rational criticism” (2002, 255) of an agent’s 
hierarchy of desires and likings. Finally, the “model is unsocial, in that his 
[Pollock’s] rational agent does not (and cannot) belong to any groups of 
autonomous rational agents with governance structures for making deci-
sions about the actions of the group” (2002, 255). As Hitchcock concludes, 
                                                 
2  Searle is clearly echoing Davidson’s classic account where the pro-attitudes con-
stitutive of PR include “desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of 
moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public 
and private goals and values in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an 
agent directed toward actions of a certain kind.” (Davidson 1963, 686).  
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“[a] comprehensive theory of good practical reasoning would have to remedy 
all three of these lacks” (2002, 255). 
2.2. The speech act of advice 
 Of special importance in grasping the nature of the conclusion of PR is 
Gauthier’s early work on various forms of representing the conclusion of 
PR, namely: practical judgement, in practical discourse. Focussing on prac-
tical discourse, and not merely practical inference, is crucial: “For it is in 
discourse that people actually make practical judgements, and support or 
criticize them” (Gauthier 1963, 50). As such, “[a]n examination of practical 
discourse may be expected to make clear the actual criteria used in apprais-
ing practical arguments, and hence in establishing practical judgements” 
(Gauthier 1963, 50). Practical discourse (practical argumentation, deliber-
ative practices) is thus not only a display mechanism for inner practical 
reasoning but also an important entry point into the elements and stand-
ards of practical reasoning (Lewiński 2017).3 
 Gauthier’s central idea is fairly straightforward: 
The basic practical conversation may be formulated simply: 
‘What shall I do?’ ‘Do x!’ The response is most naturally put in 
the imperative mood, although it need not be; one might say, ‘I 
advise you to do x’, or ‘Why not do x?’, or ‘You should do x’. […] 
 Grammatically, the imperative mood is restricted in person 
to the second, and the first plural, and in tense to the present. 
These restrictions are of considerable importance in determining 
the relationship between imperatives and practical judgements, 
which are expressed in the indicative mood, and hence in any 
person and any tense. (Gauthier 1963, 50-51). 
                                                 
3  Following Witek’s (2021) terminology, practical reasoning/inference would have 
the “thinking-to-speaking direction of influence,” while practical argumentation/dis-
course the “speaking-to-thinking direction of influence.” However, Mercier and Sper-
ber’s (2011) idea that reasoning is for argumentation puts into question the very 
idea of purely discourse-independent reasons with a uniquely one-way, thinking-to-
speaking direction of influence. 
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 Based on this, Gauthier proposes to study five broad classes of impera-
tives: i) commands, orders, directions; ii) instructions and directions (sic!); 
iii) advice, recommendations; iv) urges, exhortations; v) requests.4 While all 
these classes can be grammatically represented via the basic imperative 
phrase (“Do x!”), they are obviously distinct. According to Gauthier, the par-
adigmatic form is advice—contrary to the other imperatives of practical dis-
course, the very function of advice among men is “to assist their fellows with 
their practical problems” (Gauthier 1963, 77): “Advice is characteristically 
sought as a result of practical concern. Confronted with a practical problem, 
a man may not only make a personal judgement of what he should do, but 
may also ask for the judgements of others” (Gauthier 1963, 53).5 The bulk of 
Gauthier’s work is thus dedicated to analysing the conditions for successful 
advice and the intricate differentia specifica of advice in the broader genus of 
imperatives, esp. instructions, recommendations, hortations, commands and 
“moral counsel” (Gauthier 1963, esp. Chs. 4, 5, 10). In particular: 
In giving advice, and in determining what advice to give, the 
adviser is expected to reason from the advisee’s practical basis. 
In advising, we treat someone else’s problem from his point of 
view. In recommending, we consider whether our experience is 
relevant to recommendee’s problem, regarded from his stand-
point. Thus, in arguing from the situation in which advisee finds 
himself to a conclusion about what he should do, the adviser must 
take, as premisses with practical force, those which he believes to 
be held by advisee. (Gauthier 1963, 54-55)6 
                                                 
4  See (Condoravdi and Lauer 2012) and (Portner 2018) for recent categorisations 
of imperatives which, while in many aspects similar, do not refer to Gauthier’s work.  
5  This idea has clearly Aristotelian provenance: “We call in others to aid us in 
deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to de-
ciding” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b11). 
6  Furthermore: “Directly hortatory terms, such as ‘urge’ and ‘exhort’, do not entail 
the commitment to concern with the problems of the person addressed that terms 
of advice imply. To urge someone to do something is to seek to move him to do it 
by open verbal means” (Gauthier 1963, 59); “Imperatives of advice concern practical 
problems of advisee. Imperatives of command do not. If you are authorized to 
command me to carry out certain actions, then it is inappropriate for me to consider 
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 Two important comments are immediately necessary here. First, 
Gauthier does not use any of the conceptual vocabulary of speech acts—
illocutionary forces, felicity conditions, etc. This is natural, given the timing 
of his work. Similarities are, of course, striking: Gauthier clearly analyses 
various directive speech acts (see Searle, 1975). He also specifically thanks 
his original supervisor at Oxford—“the late Professor J. L. Austin”—for 
illuminating discussions on the concept of advice. However, despite most 
precious insights into the nature of speech acts used in practical discourse, 
the lack of this specific conceptual framework is a serious limitation.7 
 Second, and perhaps an intellectually graver limitation, is Gauthier’s 
understanding of practical reasoning as restricted to two basic forms: pru-
dential and moral reasoning. Prudential problems, deriving from the prac-
tical base of an agent’s individual wants and desires, “are essentially pri-
vate, personal, not affecting others” (Gauthier 1963, 149). By contrast, 
“moral problems are not and cannot be purely personal, since they involve 
situations in which the interests of others are affected” (Gauthier 1963, 
149). Using Hitchcock’s terms adduced above, prudential discourse is thus 
not solipsistic (it is discourse, after all), but it is still egoistic and unsocial. 
Indeed, the speech acts mentioned above pertain to prudential discourse, 
and they are essentially private transactions between one reasoning agent 
(esp., advisee) and another reasoning agent (advisor), meant to solve the 
private practical problem of the former. In this context, advice is under-
standably the most central speech act. In the context of moral discourse, 
however, “advice” morphs into “moral counsel” by virtue of extending the 
content of the premisses of PR, namely, by including wants and interests 
of others beyond the advisee: “The schema which served for prudential 
practical reasoning is then adapted to the general case by substituting the 
extended basis, and the class of premisses with practical force derivable 
from it” (Gauthier 1963, 86). In this way, moral discourse would addition-
ally not be egoistic, since “all wants of all persons are to be included in the 
                                                 
whether I shall benefit from the actions, or even whether to perform the actions. If 
you are entitled to command, I am obliged to obey. The responsibility for the per-
formance of the actions is assumed by the commander.” (Gauthier 1963, 61). 
7  For a recent account of advising, building on Searle’s (1969, 1975) formulation 
of the felicity conditions of the speech act of advising, see (van Poppel 2019).  
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basis of [moral] practical reasoning of any agent” (Gauthier 1963, 86, em-
phasis in original). 
 However, both forms of PR studied by Gauthier remain largely unsocial. 
There is no room for joint, collective action and collective reasoning that is 
not immediately moral. Taking a walk with a friend, jointly fixing a car, or 
carrying a table together, are all practical problems that typically require 
practical reasoning and do affect others, yet do not call for moral counsel. 
Gauthier has very little to say about how we coordinate and resolve such 
issues in practical discourse. As a result, despite his undeniably relevant 
insights, some element is still missing.  
2.3. The speech act of proposal 
 A good starting point towards investigating this missing element is to 
argue PR is a social—or, in principle, socializable—activity. This argument 
has quite some tradition in philosophy, as it characteristically connects PR 
to an argumentative activity of deliberation, a link stressed since Aristotle 
(EN).8 One main consequence of it is a shift of focus away from the internal 
propositional attitude of intention to some externalised and collective 
speech act, notably, that of proposal.9 Accordingly, the analyses of pro-
posals have attracted some attention—especially in argumentation theory 
                                                 
8  See (Lewiński 2017; 2019), (Corredor 2020), (Dascal 2005), (Green 2017), and 
(Walton 2006; 2007). While some authors claim that this connection is a sign that 
“Aristotle has confused the psychological process by which a person comes to resolve 
a practical problem with the logical argument in which the steps leading to the 
resolution are formally set out” (Gauthier 1963, 26; cf. Chang, 2016), others argue 
this might have been a deliberate choice in Aristotle’s conception, where the process 
of deliberation is constitutive of practical reason, and thus in-principle social and 
open to the back-and-forth of argumentation (Lewiński 2017; 2019; Dascal 2005).  
9  Notice, though, that Broome, somewhat inconsistently, also speaks of speech acts 
which the reasoner performs to herself: “the speech-act you perform is the act of 
expressing an attitude of yours” (Broome 2013, 253). While expressing (propositional) 
attitudes, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, is one key job speech acts do (Green 
2009; Witek 2021), they are communicative, rather than purely mental, acts which 
therefore always involve at least two parties, the speaker and the hearer, as well as the 
complex social commitments between them and larger groups (Lewiński 2021).  
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(Aakhus 2006; Corredor 2020; Ihnen Jory 2015; Kauffeld 1998; Walton 
2006). Crucially, proposals shift the agent of the conclusion of PR from an 
individual “I” or “you” to plural “we”: “so I should do m” or “so you should 
do m” is reformulated to “so let us do m”.10 While Gauthier was clearly 
aware of the fact that “the imperative mood is restricted in person to the 
second, and the first plural” (Gauthier 1963, 51), he focussed exclusively on 
the former, while having nothing to say of the latter, performed character-
istically via the “let us…” construction.  
 Aakhus (2006) analyses proposals in deliberation as speech acts located 
between Searle’s (1969; 1975) commissives (such as promises) and directives 
(such as requests) (see Table 1). Commissives are about future acts of the 
speaker who, in performing the speech act, commits her/himself to this act 
(“I will clean the room tomorrow”). Directives are about future acts of the 
hearer, whom the speaker wants to get to do something (“Clean the room 
tomorrow, will you?!”). Proposals concern future acts of both the speaker 
and the hearer, and their illocutionary point is “to enlist H[earer] in mutu-
ally bringing about [act] A” (Aakhus 2006, 406). They would thus be typi-
cally expressed by constructions such as “Let’s (clean the room tomorrow)!” 
or “How about we (clean the room tomorrow)?”  
 According to Aakhus, “[w]hen proposing, a speaker puts forward a future 
act that requires a joint performance by the speaker and hearer” (Aakhus 
2006, 405) and, additionally, “the speaker frames the proposed actions as 
mutually beneficial” (Aakhus 2006, 404). In this way, proposing is a speech 
act through which the conclusion of PR is put forward for consideration in 
the argumentative activity of deliberation: “A proposer (P) puts forward the 
proposal in part to get agreement but also to test for doubts and objections 
[…] that may in turn help P design a more acceptable proposal” (Aakhus 
2006, 406). Therefore, proposing belongs to the kind of illocutionary acts in 
which “speakers necessarily or typically incur probative burdens,” that is, “a 
speaker cannot, other things being equal, responsibly dismiss an addressee’s 
demands for proof” (Kauffeld 1998, 247).11 What follows is that felicitous 
                                                 
10  In Walton’s formulation, the conclusion of PR in “multi-agent deliberation” is a 
“practical ought-statement” (Walton 2006, 204): We ought to do it.  
11  This condition is often, e.g. in (Pagin 2016), (Watson 2004), and (Williamson 
1996), seen as a distinguishing characteristic of assertions—but it does not seem 
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proposals concern actions which are: 1) communicated and open for discus-
sion, thus surely not solipsistic; 2) mutually beneficial rather than purely 
egoistic; 3) jointly performed, and therefore social. In this way, the analysis 
of proposals addresses all three concerns regarding individualistic approaches 
to PR identified by Hitchcock (see Sec. 2.1). However, as I will argue below—
even if a paradigmatic case—proposal is only one of the possible speech acts 
which can convey the conclusions of PR.  
Table 1: Felicity conditions for requesting, promising and proposing  
(Aakhus 2006, 406) 
                                                 
right. Quite the opposite, each speech act can be challenged and its felicity conditions 
tested, whereby some kind of “proof” by the original speaker must be provided. This 
proof would typically relate to its sincerity and preparatory conditions. This applies 
even to expressives: “Ouch!”—“No, this cannot really hurt, don’t exaggerate.” See 







Future act A of H. Future act A of H + S. Future act A of S. 
Preparatory 
Condition 
H is able to do A. 
S believes H is able to 
do A. 
It is not obvious to 
both S and H that H 
will do A in the nor-
mal course of events of 
his own accord. 
H and S are able to 
contribute to the ac-
complishment of A. 
It is not obvious to 
both S and H that ei-
ther S or H can do A 
of their own accord in 
the normal course of 
events. 
That A will leave nei-
ther S nor H worse off 
than not doing A. 
S is able to do A. 
S believes S is able to 
do A. 
It is not obvious to 
both S and H that S 
will do A in the nor-
mal course of events of 
his own accord. 
Sincerity 
Condition 
S wants H to do A. S believes A will mutu-
ally benefit H and S or 
that if it benefits S it 
will leave H no worse 
off. 
S intends that in utter-
ing to do A he is under 
the obligation to do A. 
Essential 
Condition 
Counts as an attempt 
to get H to do A. 
Counts as an attempt 
to enlist H in mutually 
bringing about A. 
Counts as an attempt 
to commit S to do A. 
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2.4. Proviso: Any speech act can conclude PR 
 All speech acts, including assertive speech acts, are, well, acts. They are 
intentionally performed human acts, based on some kind of linguistic, cul-
tural and societal conventions.12 As such, while they may be performed 
without profound deliberation—think of common expressives such as 
“Ouch!” or “Sorry!”—speech acts typically result from some prior judgment. 
That is, we need to practically reason, inside of us, to perform this and no 
other speech act in this very situation. In any communicative activity, we 
thus constantly conclude our internal deliberations with a conclusion “I 
should say X now” or “I should perform speech act of the kind Y (apologise, 
deny, object to, approve).” In this respect, there is similar PR behind com-
missive speech acts such as “So I shall catch the 2:30 train to London” and 
assertions such as “So the cat is on the mat.” In Searle’s words: 
There is thus a sense in which all reasoning is practical, because 
it all issues in doing something. In the case of theoretical reason, 
the doing is typically a matter of accepting a conclusion or hy-
pothesis on the basis of argument or evidence. Theoretical reason 
is, thus, a special case of practical reason. (Searle 2001, 90-91)  
 Yet this sense is indeed special and perhaps trivial: speech acts are our 
intentional contributions to communicative activities and are all, in this 
sense, direct executions of some inner practical inference regarding our com-
municative involvement (roughly, our communicative plan).  
 Importantly, this practical communicative reasoning can be either a 
matter of descriptive psychology or of normative reconstruction. In descrip-
tive studies, the behind-the-scenes working of practical inference in specifi-
cally argumentative communicative activities has been well documented by 
Hample (2005), Mercier and Sperber (2011), Paglieri (2013), and others. In 
general, forms of instrumental or strategic PR, characterised by a cost-
benefit analysis of what and how efficiently one can achieve with a given 
argumentative contribution, have been identified. Arguers decide to per-
form and edit their arguments based on considerations such as chance of 
                                                 
12  See (Austin 1975), (Strawson 1964), and (Searle 1969); for a recent overview, see 
(Harris et al. 2018). 
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success, identity and relation management, negative and positive politeness, 
situational appropriateness, as well as truth and relevance of their argu-
ments.13 While these results have not been cast in the language of PR about 
what to do, they clearly can be.  
 But the PR behind the performance of a given speech can also be un-
derstood in terms of normative reconstruction that can be paraphrased as: 
“a speaker who performs the act of ϕ-ing is to be ready to rationalize her 
speech act and reconstruct a practical reasoning whose conclusion would be 
So I should have ϕ-ed.” This reconstruction would thus reveal the structure 
of reasons motivating a speaker’s performance of this, and no other, speech 
act. As such, it would always be an explanatory reconstruction having the 
structure of PR. This should not be confused with the possible reconstruc-
tion of the reasons justifying my performance of a given speech act. Theo-
retical reasons need justification “on the basis of argument or evidence” 
(Searle 2001, 91) and are concluded via any of the speech acts belonging to 
“the ‘assertive’ family”: from mere guesses, to justified presumptions and 
conjectures, to strong assertions grounded in knowledge (Green 2009). Prac-
tical reasons, by contrast, need justification grounded in values, desires, 
preferences, and a comparative assessment of means, and are concluded via 
any of the action-inducing speech acts described below in Section 5.  
 Take a simple example: I have knowledge of the contextually required 
standard of a certain finding F. I am thus justified in issuing a straightforward 
assertion F. However, given this finding directly challenges results of a revered 
professor and my close colleague X, I decide to put forth my finding with the 
illocutionary force of a conjecture. I thus downgrade my assertive speech act 
for reasons of mutual respect and amicable cooperation. My conjecture is thus 
theoretically justified, and excessively so, by the evidence I have in hand, and 
practically motivated by concern for values my community (allegedly) holds 
dear. All this is different from performing specific speech acts as conclusions 
directly justified by PR: an issue this study focusses on.  
 To conclude, there is some practical inference, even if largely uncon-
scious, behind performance of any speech act, including assertives and all 
argumentative speech acts. The reconstructible practical inference leading 
                                                 
13  For a discussion, see Chapter 4 of (Hample 2005). 
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to the use of speech on a given occasion is, however, quite different from 
performing speech acts presented as conclusions of one’s deliberate practical 
reasoning. Concluding that “Aristotle could well have written Rhetoric all 
by himself” requires very different supporting arguments than the conclu-
sion “let’s employ Aristotle.”14 
2.5. Counter-Proviso: Only assertives conclude our reasoning,  
whether theoretical or practical 
 Let’s consider the following example, due to van Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst (1984, 97-98).  
 Let’s take an umbrella, or do you want to get wet? 
It doesn’t take much imagination, nor work, to reconstruct this utterance 
as a commonly experienced instance of PR. The speaker starts with a con-
clusion—“Let’s take an umbrella”—that expresses an intention to act in a 
specific way. This conclusion is grounded in the desire—here explicitly ex-
pressed via a rhetorical question—that “we don’t want to get wet.” Unex-
pressed is the (obvious, hence the enthymematic form) belief that in a 20th-
century Western society one good (perhaps the best, or at least satisfactory) 
way of not getting wet while going out is using an umbrella. Further, the 
conclusion here is clearly a speech act of proposal, just as defined above, 
involving a joint action and matching desires of both speaker and hearer 
(walking together in the rain, staying dry under the umbrella).15 
 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 98), however, see this sort of 
interpretation as “erroneous,” at least within their framework of speech acts 
in specifically argumentative discussions:  
The utterance ‘Let’s take an umbrella’ should not be seen as the 
expressed opinion at the centre of the dispute that the speaker is 
trying to resolve with the aid of the utterance ‘or do you want to 
get wet?’ Rather it is a statement indicating that the speaker 
recognizes the possibility of a dispute arising about his proposal. 
                                                 
14  I am indebted to Maciej Witek for discussion in this section.  
15  See (Gilbert 1990) for a classic account of this minimal kind of collective activity 
of walking together. 
Conclusions of Practical Argument: A Speech Act Analysis 433 
Organon F 28 (2) 2021: 420–457 
This dispute might then be centred on the question of whether 
the proposal was a good one. The expressed opinion on which this 
particular dispute is centred is not formulated explicitly, but that 
is always possible. For example, the speaker might say: ‘It is ad-
visable to take an umbrella.’ This statement is an elementary 
illocutionary act of the assertive type. 
 In fully externalized discussions the expressed opinions and 
the argumentation must always in our view consist of elementary 
illocutions belonging to the class of the assertives. Expressed 
opinions and argumentations consisting superficially of illocutions 
of some other type must first be analysed in such a way that it 
is clear exactly what assertives are involved. If these expressed 
opinions and argumentations could not be construed as assertives 
a resolution of the dispute would be impossible, since it is only 
possible to resolve disputes thanks to the specific committedness 
associated with the performcance of assertives. (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1984, 98, italics in original) 
 To understand their misgivings here, we need to grasp “the specific com-
mittedness” of assertives. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, “the 
illocutionary point of the members of the class of assertives [is] to commit 
the speaker (to a greater or lesser degree) to the acceptability or unaccept-
ability of the expressed proposition” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 
97, italics in original). Further, this “specific committedness” results in the 
“obligation to defend” the acceptability of a speech act, which they consider 
“to be a general feature of assertives, distinguishing them as a class from 
other illocutionary acts” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 96).16 
 As already mentioned, these claims are made in their task of developing 
a speech act-based theory of idealised argumentative discussions. What is 
at stake in such discussions is defensibility of a standpoint (+, -, ø; this is 
a conversational equivalent of a conclusion) in respect of an expressed opin-
ion (O). Symbolically, 
 +/(O(p)) 
                                                 
16  See also (Green 2009), (Houtlosser 1998), (Pagin 2016), (Watson 2004), and 
(Williamson 1996). 
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reads: my standpoint in respect of O is that O is the case (see van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (1984, 114; ‘-’ would mean “isn’t the case”, and ‘ø’ “I 
have no standpoint on the issue”). More precisely, we should add: my stand-
point in respect of O is that O is an acceptable assertive with respect to its 
propositional content p. As we could see, this extends to other classes of 
speech acts, so for example, 
 +/(O(P(p))) 
would read: my standpoint in respect of the expressed opinion O that the 
proposal P to take an umbrella (p) is good, is that O is an acceptable as-
sertive with respect to the Proposal’s being good.  
 Three arguments can be lodged against this, otherwise interesting, recon-
struction of the conclusions of PR. First, each and every speech act would, at 
least for the purposes of argumentation analysis, be, eventually, an assertive.17 
A reduction of all speech acts to assertives is arguably not the claim van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst propound. Instead, they seem to defend a weaker 
claim that when we conclude an argument by making an utterance that in a 
non-argumentative context would be naturally taken to constitute the per-
formance of a non-assertoric act only, the actual function of the utterance is 
that of making an assertion about the non-assertoric illocution in question. 
But even this weaker claim undermines the “central insight” of speech act 
theory, namely, that “language is a medium for many kinds of action, but its 
superficial uniformity tends to mask this fact” (Harris et al. 2018, 1). Indeed, 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s definition of assertives seems to point to a 
very “general committedness” of speech acts, rather than “specific commit-
tedness” of assertives: all speech acts have satisfaction conditions (truth con-
                                                 
17  This should not be confused with Bach’s (1975) argument that “performatives 
are statements too” (note the “too”), on the ground that performative utterances 
self-referentially state their illocutionary force and the vehicle for that force, the very 
performative utterance itself. This can be made explicit by adding an assertoric for-
mula such as: ‘[In uttering this sentence,] I order you to leave’ (Bach 1975, 234). As 
such, speech acts other than assertives “comprise two simultaneous illocutionary 
acts” (Bach 1975, 229); for further discussion, see also (Searle 1989), (Bach and 
Harnish 1992), and (Reimer 1995). 
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ditions, fulfilment conditions, “answerhood” conditions) and as such all obli-
gate the speaker to defend these conditions when challenged, thus justifying 
the speech act’s acceptability. Second, their approach is prone to infinite re-
gress: I Propose p, and my expressed Opinion is that P is a good proposal, 
and my Standpoint is that my O is acceptable and… why not: Claim that my 
Standpoint is correct, and then Endorse the Claim, and Assert the Endorse-
ment as true, etc.? Third, any “assertorification” of directive and commissive 
speech acts—proposals, recommendations, (moral) imperatives, pieces of ad-
vice—following the ‘It is advisable to take an umbrella’ gloss would need to 
seriously tackle the issue of moral descriptivism / realism. “It is true that ‘it 
is not good to kill people’” as a gloss of “Thou shalt not kill” carries a heavy 
burden of proof that a simple statement that “ethical, aesthetic or other nor-
mative statements” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 96) can be treated 
much in the same way does not quite carry. 
 Shortly, the idea that PR (just as any other form of linguistically ex-
pressed reasoning) always concludes in some kind of assertive is not exactly 
defensible. It is also rather cumbersome, and not very speech-acty (see also 
Jacobs 1989). There is, however, an important intuition in van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst’s interpretation of proposals: they should be defensible as “good” 
proposals. This, I argue in the next section, is an inherent feature of PR.  
3. Detailed scheme of practical argumentation 
 Before examining the various forms of conclusion of PR—which, when 
publicly performed, can better be called practical argumentation (henceforth: 
PA)—it seems necessary to understand what PA in general consists of.18 The 
scheme of PA presented in Figure 2 stems from a rich literature on practical 
argument in philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, and argumentation theory 
(Audi 2006; Broome 2013; Davidson 1963; Gauthier 1963; Pollock 1995; 
Searle 2001; Walton 2006; 2007; see Lewiński 2015; 2017 for a more detailed 
                                                 
18 The publicity element is more than a mere mode of presentation. Publicity of 
practical arguments invokes socially and institutionally recognizable commitments 
and, as such, can generate “desire-independent reasons for action” and forms of col-
lective, rather than only individual, intentionality (Searle 2001; 2010).  
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discussion). In particular, it is derived from a useful representation of PA by 
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012). While referring to their work for an anal-
ysis of all the premises constituting the scheme (Circumstances, Goal, Val-
ues), I will briefly mention five basic advantages of the scheme, focussing 






















Figure 2: The scheme of Practical Argumentation 
Derived from: Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) 
Possible, contextually-determined decision criteria: 
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practical feasibility ⦁ 
ethical, moral, or legal implications ⦁ 
likelihood of realization or of success ⦁ 
conformance with other goals or strategies, their timing, duration, or location ⦁ 
Derived from (McBurney et al. 2007, 99) 
 First, the scheme shapes the framework of relevance for (multi-party) 
deliberation. Typically, different parties argue for the contextual betterness 
of their proposals for action {M, N, O… Z} (see the “M is Best” box). Their 
deliberation develops then as an argumentative polylogue (Lewiński and 
Aakhus 2014; Lewiński 2017; 2021) along the lines of possible disagreements 
over the various elements of the structure (basic premises, inference rules 
and contextual criteria).  
 Second, the scheme distinguishes between context-independent and con-
text-dependent elements of PA. Its basic general structure (as per Fair-
clough and Fairclough: all the white boxes in Figure 2) remains constant, 
while contextual criteria for choosing “the right means” (below the diagram) 
fluctuate.  
 Third, the scheme clarifies the notion of the means-goal premise. This 
premise is grounded in one of the three basic inference licences warranting 
the choice of “the right means” taking us from the current (unwelcome) 
Circumstances to the (desired) Goals. We can thus warrant our conclusions 
by issuing a comparative claim (Chang 2016) that either the means are 
necessary, or that they are satisfactory (good enough), or that they are the 
best among all the possible alternatives.19   
 Fourth, it provides a new account of how to criticise and evaluate PA. 
It clearly demarcates the attacks on the main premises (Circumstances, 
Goals, Values, Means-Goals), from those concerning context-dependent de-
cision criteria, and from criticisms of the inference licences related to the 
type of inferential step made (necessary, satisfactory, or the best means) 
(see Lewiński 2017 for further discussion).  
 Fifth, the scheme defines its conclusion in terms of a class of action-
inducing speech acts, thus pointing to a “unity in diversity” of what we can 
argue for in PA.   
                                                 
19  For a detailed analysis, see (Lewiński 2015) and (Lewiński 2017).  
438 Marcin Lewiński 
Organon F 28 (2) 2021: 420–457 
 I will now apply this scheme to the analysis of an actual case of complex 
practical argumentation and then discuss in detail the last point.  
4. Case study: Keep it in the ground! 
 On the 16th of March 2015, the British newspaper The Guardian 
launched a media campaign to divest (dis-invest) from fossil fuels such as 
coal, oil and gas. The campaign was entitled “Keep it in the ground” and 
included, at its start, a very short petition, a “note from Alan Rusbridger, 
[The Guardian’s then] editor-in-chief”, a “full story” in which Rusbridger 
presents an elaborate argument for the petition, as well as other multi-
media materials (videos, frequently asked questions, interviews, reportage) 
related to the dangers of our massive continuing reliance on fossil fuels.20 
These texts, while originating in the same source, contain various examples 
of illocutionary acts concluding practical argument. 
 Let me start with a little note on the very slogan of the campaign: “Keep 
it in the ground.” As an utterance in an imperative mood, it seems to be 
addressed to others as a directive speech act explicitly identified as (a part 
of) “petition” (a formal request? Appeal? Plea?). However, given the nature 
of such campaigns, and the immediate contextual and co-textual infor-
mation (see below), it can also be understood as elided “(We should) keep 
it in the ground” or, even better, “(Let us) keep it in the ground”—by 
analogy with “(Let’s) give peace a chance” and other such slogans. Here, 
the addressee—the agent of PA—is the first plural, inclusive we.  
 In what follows, I focus on Rusbridger’s “full story” entitled: “The ar-
gument for divesting from fossil fuels is becoming overwhelming.”21 This 
“story” or “argument”—in fact, a well-structured complex argument—is 
introduced with the following lead:  
                                                 
20  See http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2015/mar/16/keep-
it-in-the-ground-guardian-climate-change-campaign, last consulted on the 6th of 
January 2021.  
21  See https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/16/argument-dives-
ting-fossil-fuels-overwhelming-climate-change, last consulted on the 6th of January 
2021. All following quotations are from this source. 
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As progressive institutions, the Gates Foundation and Wellcome 
Trust should commit to taking their money out of the companies 
that are driving global warming, says the Guardian’s editor-in-
chief as he launches our climate campaign.  
As is appropriate for a journalistic article, it starts with a conclusion. Here, 
it is clearly a conclusion of a PA—that some agents (the Gates Foundation 
and Wellcome Trust) “should” undertake certain actions (“should commit 
to taking their money out of the companies that are driving global warm-
ing”).   
 According to Rusbridger, “[t]here are two arguments in favour of moving 
money out of the biggest and most aggressive fossil fuel companies—one 
moral, the other financial.” In saying this, he explicitly refers to two basic 
types of PR recognised in philosophy: on the one-hand, moral or value-based 
reasoning, and on the other hand, instrumental, prudential, strategic or 
means-end reasoning.22 The moral argument is analogous to “the push to 
pull money out of tobacco, arms, apartheid South Africa—or even slavery.” 
Investing big money in the fossil fuel business, even if profitable, is per se 
a bad thing to do—just like making money from arms or slave trade is. The 
chief value in the fossil fuel argument is intergenerational justice, that is, 
“concern for future generations”: through our current recklessness, we are 
burdening the future generations with all the negative consequences of cli-
mate change (see Campos 2018). The Guardian’s financial (or “pragmatic”) 
argument is, interestingly, much more profoundly argued for, likely with 
the view towards the target agents of change, financial managers. This ar-
gument is best summarised in a quote from the Bank of England’s deputy 
head of supervision for banks and insurance companies, Paul Fisher: “As 
the world increasingly limits carbon emissions, and moves to alternative 
energy sources, investments in fossil fuels—a growing financial market in 
recent decades—may take a huge hit.” That is to say, those who do not 
care about the moral implications of climate change per se, or even do not 
believe in it at all, might be driven out of further investment by prudential 
risk-assessment. 
                                                 
22  See (Gauthier 1963), (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012), and (Walton 2007). 
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 The “Keep it in the ground” campaign—as is appropriate for any other 
campaign—has a precise target: managers of endowments, investment and 
pension funds and, very specifically, the Gates Foundation and Wellcome 
Trust. It is clear in the text, though, that the problems of climate change 
policies and energy models based on fossil fuels have a number of other 
relevant stakeholders (see Rodrigues, Lewiński, and Üzelgün 2019). All of 
them can potentially be the target of the campaign, the addressees of its 
arguments and, eventually, the agents of the conclusion of the argument. 
Rusbridger mentions that at first The Guardian thought of addressing “gov-
ernments” and “politicians” in general (“MPs, presidents, prime ministers 
and members of congress”)—but political action on climate change has 
proven far from satisfying: “the people who represent us around the UN 
negotiating tables have moved inches, not miles.” That’s why they decided 
to address the above-mentioned big institutional investors instead. Another 
stakeholder in the “story” are the scientists, here endowed with authority 
and treated with reverence: “If only science were enough […] finance will 
eventually have to surrender to physics […] the physics is unarguable.” Of 
course, the general public is another crucial stakeholder—here, it is divided 
into present and future generations, with the responsibilities laid on those 
who can decide and act now. Finally, there are the fossil-fuel companies’ 
directors, who—by the logic of global capitalistic economy—are compelled 
to “behaviour that is overwhelmingly driven by short-term returns.” 
 We can pretty straightforwardly reconstruct the complex structure of 
PA from Rusbridger’s argument which, in this case, is remarkably explicit.23 
The current Circumstance is that of a climate change crisis caused by the 
overreliance on fossil fuels. This premise is briefly stated in the very first 
sentence of the piece: “The world has much more coal, oil and gas in the 
ground than it can safely burn.” To address, or at least attenuate, this crisis 
we need to strive for a concrete Goal: “80% of the known coal reserves will 
have to stay underground, along with half the gas and a third of the oil 
                                                 
23  As correctly noted by one of the anonymous reviewers, many public arguments 
have implicit premises to reconstruct—a major challenge for argumentation analy-
sis—while “some instances of practical reasoning in the public sphere have explicit 
premises and implicit conclusions (the encouragement for an action is conversationally 
or conventionally implied).” This complication does not directly affect this very case. 
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reserves.” Attaining this goal is necessary “if we and our children are to 
have a reasonable chance of living stable and secure lives 30 or so years 
from now.” In general, the main Values and duties underlying the entire 
argument are “concern for future generations,” “the protection of the pub-
lic,” “human health and science.” But which means can be conducive to 
reaching this Goal and embodying the Values? As already mentioned, in 
The Guardian’s view the best action to take (“the best” Means-Goal prem-
ise) is to directly call to divest from major fossil fuel companies—rather 
than, for instance, “campaigning for a paragraph to be inserted into the 
negotiating text at the UN climate talks in Paris this December” (see 
Lewiński and Mohammed 2019). Appropriately for deliberations, different 
options are thus considered and one is chosen as the option.    
 Finally, let us look at the Conclusions of the argument. These are ex-
plicitly indicated with the “so” connective: 
So we ask that the Gates Foundation and Wellcome Trust com-
mit now to divesting from the top 200 fossil fuel companies within 
five years. And that they immediately freeze any new investment 
in the same companies. 
 This, however, is not the only conclusion of the text: “We will, of course, 
suggest that the Guardian Media Group does the same, and keeps you in-
formed about its own deliberations and decisions.” Finally, the readers are 
requested to act on the argument too: “Please sign, retweet and generally 
spread news about the petition.” 
 Shortly, we have here a rather motley assortment of conclusions, at least 
when compared to a typical first-person-singular conclusion of most PR, as 
examined in philosophy (“so I shall take the 2:30 train to London”). What 
can be done about it? 
5. Conclusions as speech acts 
 I have already argued that a speech act approach can bring about the 
required level of nuance to our understanding of the conclusions of PA. 
Indeed, Austin’s (1975) initial distinction between fact-relevant constatives 
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and action-relevant performatives can be understood against the back-
ground of the distinction between theoretical and practical uses of reason: 
we constate on the basis of our theoretical reasons and we perform of the 
basis of our practical reasons.24 Importantly, while the constative-performa-
tive distinction does not mirror differences between assertive and non-as-
sertive speech acts as later elaborated by Austin himself and many others, 
e.g., Urmson (1977), there is a sense in which the dichotomy between the-
oretical and practical reason permeates the two. “Assertion and its cousins,” 
such as conjectures, presumptions or guesses are all truth-relevant speech 
acts, whose norms require a psychological state of belief or at least ac-
ceptance, justified by evidence of an adequate sort.25 As briefly put by Stal-
naker, “[t]o accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason” (2002, 
716), and this reason is theoretical reason. Some of the non-assertive speech 
acts, by contrast, are justified by practical reason and performed as its 
conclusion.  
 Against this background, the central question of this paper can be for-
mulated as follows: Which speech acts “convey” or “express” the conclusion 
of practical reasoning (PR) externalised in a text, that is, of practical argu-
mentation (PA)?  
 As a preliminary, consider Searle’s claim that “to function in delibera-
tion a reason must be for a type of action, it must be for the agent, and it 
must be known to the agent” (Searle 2001, 99). PA, being public, takes care 
of the last condition all by itself: the reasons are openly presented so—as 
long as the “normal input and output conditions” for communication obtain 
(Searle 1969, 57)—they are known to the agent. What remains to be  
                                                 
24  As is well known, Austin in fact did not endorse this distinction: his work instead 
shows that he either abandoned it in favour of the analysis of the locutionary/il-
locutionary/perlocutionary acts or, as Sbisà (2007) argues, from the very beginning 
presented it rather as a premise of a reductio ad absurdum argument: assuming that 
the constative-performative dichotomy holds leads to absurd consequences (e.g., 
statements too function as performatives leaving the set of pure constatives empty), 
so it cannot be right.  
25  Strong for assertions, weak for guesses; for a discussion, see (Green 2009) and 
(Witek 2021). 
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analysed are the type of action and the type of agent that practical argu-
mentation is “for.” 
 For Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), the conclusion of PA has the 
form: “Claim for action: Agent (presumably) ought to do A.” In their dis-
cussion of this point (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 45-46), the Fair-
cloughs notice that the first-person-singular analyses of PR opportunisti-
cally conceal the fact that the arguer and the agent of action are not always 
the same. We can, and often do, argue practically with someone else’s action 
in the conclusion (“All things considered, the best thing to do now is for 
you to go and apologise”). Shortly, the philosophers’ agent-self (Searle 2001, 
99), can be a self different than the arguer-self.26     
 The scope of the claim for action is further complicated by formulations 
such as “should” or “ought to.” These are notoriously ambiguous, even un-
derdetermined—if not semantically, then surely pragmatically.27 In every-
day spoken language we manage this ambiguity very well trough skilful, 
even if unconscious, use of prosody and contextual information. Compare: 
You should just let him go – a friendly suggested advice. 
You should let him go please – an appeal or entreaty. 
You should let him go right now – a command.  
(Note that in spoken discourse, the illocutionary force equivalent 
to “just,” “please,” and “right now” can be conveyed solely by 
prosodic elements, such as rising/falling intonation or accent.) 
Even in such simple examples the pragmatic analysis of expressions such as 
“should” leaves the notion of a “claim for action” largely underspecified. 
The analysis in the previous section likewise identified that, quite tellingly, 
The Guardian editors conclude their arguments with varied “claims for ac-
tions” by agents other than themselves. What exactly can this “claim” be?  
 As analysed above, in the case of the conclusion of PA, the speech act 
of proposal has been considered a paradigm case in (Aakhus 2006),  (Cor-
                                                 
26  This limitation to the agent-self has clear Aristotelian roots: “Deliberation is 
about the things to be done by the agent himself” (EN, 1112b32).  
27  See esp. (Portner 2007) and (Portner 2018). 
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redor 2020), (Ihnen Jory 2016), (Kauffeld 1998), and (Walton 2006). Pro-
posals are speech acts located between commissives (such as promises) and 
directives (such as requests).28 Due to this peculiarity they belong—next to 
bets, offers and bids—to a class of speech acts inescapably requiring an 
action of both the speaker and the hearer. Taken together, commissives, 
directives, and their hybrids (such as proposals or offers) form a class of 
what I will call action-inducing speech acts (see Table 2)—in opposition to 
assertives (representatives), expressives and declarations. Action-inducing 
speech acts are characterised by their world-to-words direction of fit (Searle 
1975),29 as their point is to get an agent (whether “I”, “you”, or “we”) to 
                                                 
28  Searle and Vanderveken treat proposals, somewhat in passing, as instances of 
directives: “Thus, for example, the illocutionary force of accepting (a proposal, an 
invitation, etc.) has one more preparatory condition than the illocutionary force of 
commitment to a future action, namely that the speaker has been given a directive 
that allows for the possibility of refusal” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 66, italics 
added). For reasons described in Section 2.3 this doesn’t seem right. That proposals 
do more than direct others to do something is clear in that they are, inherently, also 
conditional promises (just like bets and offers): Let’s go for a walk = You should go 
for a walk + If you do, I will come join you. Requests and invitations, discussed by 
Lance and Kukla (2013, 461), do not have this conditional commissive component, 
but at most some weak conditional expressive component: Do something for me + 
If you do, I’ll be happy (the terms are mine). It is precisely this addition of a condi-
tional commissive component that turns acts such as requests or invitations into 
offers and proposals. Compare a) with b):  
 Parent to a child:  
 a) Clean your room, please!  
 b) Clean your room – and I’ll let you play games the whole night!  
If the speech act is perlocutionarily successful (i.e., the child cleans the room), the 
child’s natural response to b) would be: “I’ve cleaned the room, can I turn on my 
PlayStation now?” If the parent hesitates (“Well…”), the child’s reaction would al-
most certainly be “You promised!”   
29  This, of course, has not escaped Searle’s attention: “Since the direction of fit is 
the same for commissives and directives, it would give us a more elegant taxonomy 
if we could show that they are really members of the same category. I am unable to 
do this […] and am left with the inelegant solution of two separate categories with 
the same direction of fit” (Searle 1975, 356); see also (Searle 2001). Lance and Kukla 
(2013) characterise promises as “reverse imperatives”, since both these types “oblige 
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perform an action that will bring the world into a state captured in the 
intentional content of the speech act. (By contrast, the goal of assertive 
speech acts with the words-to-world direction of fit is to capture in their 
content some existing state of the world.)30 Naturally, so to speak, it is 
exactly speech acts with an “upward” (world-to-words, world-to-mind) di-
rection of fit that PR is “about.” Given their different direction of fit, the 
similarity between practical and theoretical reason breaks: 
The difference between theoretical and practical reason is in the 
direction of fit of the conclusion: mind-to-world, in the case of 
drawing a conclusion from evidence or premises, and world-to-
mind, in the case of forming a decision and hence an intention on 
the basis of considerations. (Searle 2001, 91)  
 Now, the elements of the class of action-inducing speech acts can be 
distinguished, as discussed above, along two dimensions: (1) their primary 
agent: the speaker, the hearer31, or both; and (2) their illocutionary 
strength, ranging from the cancellable and nearly off-record to fully en-
dorsed and on-record.32 Together, these two axes create an ordered matrix 
of “claims for action”—or speech acts which can conclude PA (Table 2).  
                                                 
someone to do something for someone” (Lance and Kukla 2013, 458-459, fn. 3). In 
his proposal challenging the very bases of Searle’s taxonomy of speech acts, Hanks 
(2018) treats all the speech acts with a world-to-word direction of fit as a “unified 
category” with an “imperative propositional content,” regardless of whether they 
involve commitments of a speaker (as in promises) or a hearer (as in orders). See 
(Green 2018) for a challenge to Hanks’s challenge. 
30  Note that for Searle (1975) expressives have no direction of fit at all, while decla-
rations have dual direction: both words-to-world and world-to-words.  
31  For the current purposes, it is inconsequential to carefully distinguish between 
the directly addressed Hearer (“you”) and some potential, indirect Hearers or bys-
tanders, such as third parties (“s/he”, “they”). These differences do not affect the 
analysis proposed here—they do, however, play a significant role in understanding 
how speech acts function in a multi-party (n>2) context; see (Clark and Carlson 
1982), (Levinson 1988), and (Lewiński 2021). 
32  Jacobs and Jackson (1983) study some weak directive speech acts (such as “indirect 
requests,” “hints and prompts” and even seemingly “innocent remarks”) and place 
them “on a continuum according to the degree to which the act‐type is dissociated 
from the illocutionary force of a [direct] request” (Jacobs and Jackson 1983, 285).  
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Table 2: Action-inducing speech acts as conclusions of practical  
argumentation 
 What is common to these various action-inducing speech acts is, of 
course, that they can all be complemented with the phrase “to do A”: “I 
promise to do A,” “I advise you to do A,” “we guarantee to do A.” Their 
strength—here divided for illustrative purposes into three levels—can quite 
straightforwardly be grasped by our ordinary intuitions: “I’ve thought 
about it a lot and: maybe we can go and apologise? / let’s go and apologise 
/ we must go and apologise.”  
 Given these distinctions, we can now more precisely characterise the 
explicit conclusions of The Guardian’s campaign: First, its very title—
“Keep it in the ground”—in the interpretation suggested above, takes as an 
agent the inclusive we. It is, in terms of speech acts, a joint proposal or call: 
neutral-to-strong combination of a directive (you should) and a commissive 
(we should too).33 Second, the main conclusion is addressed to “them”—the 
                                                 
33  While paradigmatically calls would be “second-person calls” (Lance and Kukla 
2013), they can also be “inclusive we” calls, such as in “I call on all of us gathered 
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Gates Foundation and Wellcome Trust—and explicitly identified as a (sec-
ond-person) “call,” a strong directive speech act. Third, “[we] the Guardian 
Media Group”—the exclusive we (us)—concludes the argument with a dec-
laration of intention or “suggestion,” a weak commissive speech act. Finally, 
“you,” “the readers” are requested to spread the news. This is a conclusion 
expressed through a directive speech act, of a rather neutral force (it is 
neither only suggested nor strongly demanded or called for). 
6. Extensions and challenges 
 In this paper I mostly did two things. I asked which illocutionary acts 
“convey” or “express” the conclusion of practical reasoning and I responded 
these are various action-inducing speech acts. This broad category of acts 
shares the world-to-word direction of fit and can be preliminarily organised 
by the agent of the action induced (not to be confused with the concluder 
of the practical argument) and the illocutionary strength of the act. But 
between these two things I also reviewed various other takes on what the 
nature or function of the conclusion of practical argument could be (to 
intend, to advise, to propose, to state), proposed one possible scheme of 
practical argument, and briefly analysed some naturally occurring instances 
of practical argument with their varied conclusions. In this final section, I 
start dealing with some possible challenges to the account offered, but with 
an eye towards useful extensions. 
 The most common formulation of the conclusion of practical argument 
contains the somewhat enigmatic expression “I should” / “I ought to” per-
form a certain action. In this way, PR ends with something like a moral 
obligation or imperative of the individual agent-self. Accordingly, it is the 
“I / exclusive we” form that constitutes the traditional area of philosophical 
investigation into practical and moral reasoning. Both the actions and ob-
ligations of single and, more recently, collective subjects are treated in detail 
far exceeding this work. However, for speech act theorists such as Searle, 
reasons for action and their conclusions are best understood not through 
                                                 
here to exercise maximum restraint.” In this latter case, they are pragmatically equ-
ivalent to “We [inclusive] must exercise maximum restraint.”   
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some external ethical systems containing moral obligations “I” or “we” 
should fulfil, but rather through “the human ability to create, through the 
use of language, a public set of commitments” (Searle 2001, 183, emphasis 
in original). This set consists of the consequences of various speech acts we 
perform. It is therefore the analysis of speech acts that can illuminate the 
structure and conclusions of our public practical argumentation.  
 Throughout this paper I have largely followed Searle’s (1975) well-
known taxonomy of speech acts into five broad categories (assertives/rep-
resentatives, commissives, directives, expressives and declarations) rather 
than Austin’s (1975, Ch. XII) original taxonomy (verdictives, exercitives, 
commissives, behabitives and expositives). Indeed, one might argue that 
Austin’s exercitives are particularly relevant here34:  
An exercitive is the giving of a decision in favour of or against a 
certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It is a decision that 
something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement that it is so: 
it is advocacy that it should be so, as opposed to an estimate that 
it is so; (Austin 1975, 154) 
 Many of the illocutionary acts discussed here—orders, pieces of advice, 
recommendations, entreaties, pleas—are listed by Austin in this category.35 
However, in line with his incipient institutional ontology, Austin delineated 
a somewhat more specific category of largely “legislative or executive acts”: 
vetoes, appointments, excommunications, proclamations, authorizations, 
etc. (Austin 1975, Ch. XII). As such, however, the class of exercitives can 
                                                 
34  Austin’s commissives have been unreservedly appropriated by Searle (1975, 356), 
so this is not a point of concern. Further, “I conclude…” is obviously a discursive 
expositive on Austin’s account, a type of a speech act instrumental in “the clarifying 
of reasons, arguments, and communications” (Austin 1975, 162). As is clear from my 
arguments, I did not aim at this sort of metalinguistic characterization here.  
35  In a similar vein, Corredor (2020) classifies the act of collectively “accepting a 
proposal” in a deliberation dialogue as an Austinian exercitive, while maintaining 
that (an earlier) speech act of “making a proposal” belongs to the class of verdictives. 
Since her work was published after this paper was originally submitted, I have no 
space to fully engage with her account. However, given Austin’s definitions, it seems 
the reverse might be correct: making a proposal seems to be an exercitive, while 
(officially) accepting it is a verdictive. 
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be justifiably criticized for lacking a straightforward principle of classifica-
tion and, hence, for being too heterogeneous, with many examples defying 
the very definition of the class: “nominating, appointing, and excommuni-
cating are not the ‘giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course 
of action,’ much less are they ‘advocating’ it. Rather they are, as Austin 
himself might have said, performances of these actions, not advocacies of 
anything” (Searle 1975, 353). Given this, Searle counts them among decla-
rations, with all their peculiarities regarding double direction of fit, institu-
tional preparatory conditions, void sincerity conditions, etc. Altogether, 
Searle’s organizing effort on Austin’s original ideas works well precisely in 
the context where some clear distinctions are needed as a background for 
further work. 
 In this context, recent work on imperative speech acts, while challenging 
some of the simplifications of traditional speech act analysis, sheds addi-
tional light on the “you / they” category of agents. In particular, Lance and 
Kukla (2013) have examined the class of speech acts they simply call “sec-
ond-person calls,” whose prime examples include imperatives (orders, com-
mands), requests and entreaties. Their basic argument is that second-person 
calls can hardly be regarded as belonging to a unified class of directives or 
imperatives, characterised by the same illocutionary point—namely, to get 
or even oblige someone to do something—and differing mostly in strength, 
from meek invitations to forceful orders. Rather, Lance and Kukla maintain, 
“there are indefinitely many kinds of calls, with distinctive structures, 
whose subtleties help to constitute a rich moral and social space” (Lance 
and Kukla 2013, 458). According to them, especially between imperatives 
and requests there exist “deep differences”: 
It is in the nature of imperatives that they impute obligations, 
and in doing so, they do not present their target with a choice of 
whether to obey them. […] [W]hile all calls give their targets rea-
sons to act, different kinds of calls create different kinds of rea-
sons, and these kinds often cannot be understood except in rela-
tion to the types of second-personal transactions that institute 
them. We may give the name “petitionary reasons” to the dis-
tinctive kinds of reasons created by requests—that is, those that 
give the one requested the right kind of reason to act that opens 
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up the right kind of space of freedom, pressure, and so forth. […] 
An imperative is structurally incapable of giving its target a pe-
titionary reason to act. Petitionary reasons are not just weak ob-
ligations, nor are they obligations backed up by weak desires on 
the part of the requester; they are a different variety of reason 
altogether. (Lance and Kukla 2013, 462)36 
 Further, requests and invitations can also be distinguished by their prag-
matic subtleties: requests amount to a favour done by the requestee to the 
requester, while invitations appeal to matching desires of the invitee and 
inviter. As a consequence, successful invitations call for gratitude from both 
parties (“Thanks for inviting me!”—“Thanks for coming!”) whereas granted 
requests only from the requester—the recipient of a favor (Lance and Kukla 
2013, 461).  
 These arguments make it obvious that a unidimensional continuum or-
dering action-inducing speech acts based on their illocutionary strength is 
merely a heuristic appealed to for the sake of the economy of exposition. As 
described in section 2.2, this was also the basic insight of Gauthier (1963), 
who without using speech act concepts such as illocutionary force or illocu-
tionary strength, analysed the subtle differences among various directive 
speech acts much in the same way Lance and Kukla, and others, recently 
do.37 Other concerns beyond mere strength of the illocutionary point, such 
                                                 
36  In their account of imperatives, Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) even more empha-
tically criticize the view according to which “the addressee of an imperative auto-
matically becomes committed to making the content of the imperative true.” As 
they observe: “While this may be right for order uses, which intuitively create hearer 
obligations, most other uses of imperatives, even other directive uses, do not (di-
rectly) induce hearer commitments. A crucial feature of requests, pleas, warnings, 
etc. is that they do not create addressee commitments (though they may be uttered 
in the hope that the addressee takes on a commitment).” (Condoravdi and Lauer 
2012, 55). Still, as observed by Lance and Kukla, and in line with the traditional 
speech act theory, unless the speech act is infelicitous, the hearer is expected to 
respond to an imperative, and the preferred response is for the hearer to get commit-
ted (grant a request, accept an invitation) or refuse commitment with a good justi-
fication (“Sorry, I can’t make it, because…”). 
37  It is only a pity, then, that this work is completely ignored, including Gauthier’s 
ideas connecting directive speech acts to practical argumentation.  
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as the mode of achievement (command vs. request) or degree of strength of 
the sincerity conditions (beg vs. request), can and should be factored in for 
a more nuanced taxonomy.38 For now, however, the crucial point is to in-
dicate that our practical argumentation often concludes in an appeal to or 
a call for an action of a second person. In this way, despite all their intri-
guing differences, second-person calls form a category homogenous enough 
for the current purposes.   
 The current proposal also clearly allows for the practical reasoning from 
the second / third person’s desires and goals. This might resolve some of 
the apparently Moorean paradoxes of directive speech acts, such as those 
discussed by Condoravdi and Lauer (2012): 
#Call him at home! I don’t want you to but he is fine with that. 
#OK, go to Paris then since you want it so much! But, don’t 
forget, I don’t want you to. 
These examples seem to demonstrate that “it is not felicitous to follow an 
imperative with an assertion that the realization of the content goes against 
the speaker’s desires” (Condoravdi and Lauer 2012, 41-43).  
 However, such cases can be made felicitous, as long as the structure of 
PR is relative to hearer’s desires.39 Good advice is often idiomaticised in 
English to “If I were you, I would never talk to him again.” There seem to 
be no pragmatic inconsistency whatsoever in adding “although, as you 
know, I myself actually quite hate that kind of thing.” But even in the case 
                                                 
38  “Mode of achievement” and “degree of strength of the sincerity conditions” are 
among the seven basic factors distinguishing various types of speech acts in Searle 
and Vanderveken’s work. The institutional mode of authority is needed for 
commands, and a speaker who “begs, beseeches, or implores, […] expresses a stronger 
desire than if he merely requests” (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 19). Lance and 
Kukla are therefore partly wrong in attributing ignorance of these additional factors 
to Searle’s typology of speech acts. 
39  Or, even stronger, as Gauthier argues, this is the very basic condition of an 
advice: “It would clearly be impossible for the adviser to substitute his own practical 
basis in giving advice. For, from premisses about the situation, plus premisses about 
my aims, nothing follows at least prudentially, about what you should do” (1963, 
54); cf. (van Poppel 2019).  
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of straightforward grammatical imperatives, reasoning from the second per-
son’s desires conflicting the speaker’s desires is pragmatically possible:   
Parent to an early-adult child: 
OK, go to Paris then, if you want it so much! But don’t forget 
I’ve been against it all along!40  
 Overall, however, the current proposal is compatible with much of the 
recent work on imperative speech acts. This is the case with Condoravdi 
and Lauer’s approach who treat imperatives—including their various illo-
cutionary variants, from orders, pleas and requests to invitations, permis-
sions and advice—as expressions of effective preferences of the speaker. 
These effective preferences are sets of possible choices structured in a con-
sistent way from the best to the worst—a condition necessary if “the [ra-
tional] agent is to decide on a course of action” (Condoravdi and Lauer 
2012, 45). These elements are included in the model of PA presented above 
in Section 3. Indeed, while for Condoravdi and Lauer the utterers of imper-
atives are committed to their effective preferences and beliefs, in the model 
suggested here they are committed to all the premises of the PA, including 
their choice of the best, or at least satisfactory, action-inducing speech act.  
 According to Portner (2007; 2018) imperatives are linguistically per-
formed via priority modals of three varieties: deontic, bouletic and teleolog-
ical. As he puts it, “The idea behind the term ‘priority’ is that some choice 
is given priority over another” (Portner 2007, 355). Importantly, various 
subtypes of imperatives can be distinguished based on the ordering source: 
orders are deontic as they involve obligations of the hearer, invitations are 
bouletic as they appeal to the desires of the hearer, and suggestions are 
                                                 
40  Arguably, in this case a “permissive” rather than “directive” form of grammatical 
imperative is used, as argued in (Condoravdi and Lauer 2012), whereby the parent 
is reluctantly permitting the adult child to do something that s/he as a parent can 
no longer prohibit. Still, the same form of Moore’s paradox applies here, based on 
the generalization that “It seems that there is a bouletic component conventionally 
associated with imperatives. For if it were not conventional, we would expect this 
constraint to be absent in scenarios in which the speaker can be assumed to not 
share the goals of the addressee, as in disinterested advice uses.” (Condoravdi and 
Lauer 2012, 42). 
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teleological in that they refer to the goals of the hearer. Again, the struc-
turing of acts based on their priority in relation to desires, goals and obli-
gations is a central element of the approach proposed here.   
 This is not to deny that what I offered here is hardly more than a simple 
matrix ordered by the agent of the action and the illocutionary strength of 
a speech act. Even this simple matrix, however, can help us better under-
stand what practical argumentation is “about,” that is, “why” or what “for” 
we argue practically. We argue to issue various speech acts: from innocuous 
private announcements and suggestions to strong commands and solemn 
joint pledges. Further careful analysis of all such speech acts, in their nat-
ural context, with their respective felicity conditions and further conse-
quences, can sharpen our understanding of practical argument.  
 Therefore, we should do it.  
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